The role of regional information in the optimal composition of a committee by Philipp Maier et al.
The role of regional information in the optimal
composition of a committee
Philipp Maier1, Beata K. Bierut2 and Robert-Paul Berben3
August 2003
1Corresponding author. De Nederlandsche Bank, P.O. Box 98, 1000 AB Amster-
dam, The Netherlands, p.maier@dnb.nl. The views expressed are those of the authors
and need not represent the ones of the institutions aﬃliated.
2De Nederlandsche Bank and Tinbergen Institute Rotterdam
3De Nederlandsche BankAbstract
In this paper we present a model for the optimal composition of a federal or
supra-national committee. The involvement of regional (national) entities in
federal committees is typically motivated by their knowledge of regional infor-
mation about the state of the economy. Using this argument we show that if
the uncertainties regarding the state of the economy are not evenly distributed
across the currency area, the optimal representation of regions in the federal
committee increases with the overall uncertainty about their economic perfor-
mance. Second, if certain parts of the economic area behave in a relatively
synchronized way, it may not be necessary that all these regions are equally
represented in the federal committee.
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The aim of this paper is to investigate how individual countries or regions of
a currency area should be represented in the body governing monetary policy
(henceforth ￿monetary policy committee￿, MPC). Monetary policy decisions are
often made in a highly uncertain environment, where the overall state of the
economy can not be fully assessed at the moment interest rate decisions are
taken (Goodfriend, 1999). To reduce this uncertainty, information on the eco-
nomic situation in the monetary area is required. We motivate how Governors
from regional central banks ￿ by providing local information ￿ can contribute
to reduce the overall uncertainty and thereby allow a better judgement of the
state of the economy in a currency area. Then, we investigate to what extent
individual regions or countries should be part of the monetary policy commit-
tee (MPC) in a situation where the uncertainties regarding the state of the
respective economies are not equally distributed within the currency area.1
The model is formulated in terms of a monetary decision-making body, but
its implications extend beyond the monetary sphere. Representation of regional
entities in federal states or supra-national commissions (such as the European
Commission) can be motivated by the regional information they provide. Their
aim to safeguard ￿national￿ or ￿regional￿ interests (and to make sure that they
are adequately re￿ected in the ￿nal decision) is not fundamentally diﬀerent
than the regional uncertainties introduced in our model: they are the result of
uncertainty surrounding the economic situation of individuals. Thus our paper
also provides a rationale for contribution of lower branches of government in
federal or supra-national decision-making.
This paper is linked to diﬀerent strands of the literature. Olson and Zeck-
hauser (1966) examine the workings of international organisations, emphasising
the public good character of the services they supply. Casella (1992) analyses
the desirability to join a monetary union. Although the setup of the model is
very diﬀerent (no modelling of information uncertainties), Casella￿s results are
comparable to ours in that small countries may exact larger in￿uences than is
warranted by their size. Von Hagen and S￿ppel (1994) do not focus on the rel-
ative weight of diﬀerent countries in a monetary policy committee, but evaluate
alternative distributions of power over monetary policy between the member
and the administrative center of the union. Hefeker (2003) develops a model
b a s e do ns t r u c t u r a ld i ﬀerences across members of a currency union and ￿nds
that it can be bene￿cial to limit the representation of regions if their diﬀerences
in economic structures from the rest of the currency area are too large.
To preview the conclusions, it may be preferable for countries associated
1We do not propose a speci￿c rotation scheme or a voting procedure for the MPC, but
under general conditions we evaluate the optimal composition of such a body if information
asymmetries arise.
1with a high degree of uncertainty to have a higher representation weight than
their economic weight. This is because the likelihood of making an error in
judging these countries￿ performance decreases with the availability of regional
information. If the diﬃculties in assessing a country￿s performance are corre-
lated between countries, it is important that these countries are represented in
the MPC, but which one of those countries sends a delegate is arbitrary.
We proceed as follows. In the next section we summarize the main reasons for
regional representation within a monetary policy committee. Section 3 contains
a theoretical model of information asymmetries and their eﬀect on the optimum
composition of the monetary policy committee. In section 4 we show that
information uncertainty could oﬀer a rationale for the ECB￿s newly adopted
rotation scheme. Finally, we summarize the main ￿ndings in the last section.
2 Regional representation in the formulation of
monetary policy
European monetary policy is carried out by the Eurosystem, consisting of the
European Central Bank (ECB) and the National Central Banks (NCBs) of the
countries participating in the single currency. The supreme body is the Govern-
ing Council, which comprises members of the ECB￿s Executive Board and the
Governors of all participating NCBs. At present EMU comprises 12 member
states, but EMU enlargement might result in a union of 27 or more members.
This could increase the number of NCB Governors up to a point where it might
not be eﬃcient to grant voting rights to all Governors in all meetings. There-
fore, the ECB has recently adopted a rotation scheme for the NCB Governors,
attaching countries diﬀerent voting frequencies.2 In a situation where all acced-
ing countries will have joined, in terms of GDP the 8 smallest countries together
comprise 1% of the euro area, but according to the rotation scheme in the ECB
Governing Council their weight will be considerably larger: 38%. How can we
explain this apparent discrepancy?
Under perfect information, regional representation of central banks would
not be necessary: one single central bank would collect all relevant informa-
tion and monetary policy decisions would be taken in Washington (US FED)
and Frankfurt (ECB), respectively, without any consideration of local branches.
However, in the real world such perfect information may not be available:
￿The growing dispersion of economic activity increases the value
of local information that Reserve Bank presidents bring to the Fed-
eral Open Market Committee. ... Personal contacts are particularly
2Details on the ECB￿s rotation scheme can be found in European Central Bank (2002).
2valuable in periods of ￿nancial crisis when it is especially diﬃcult to
know what is happening in certain sectors. Reserve banks tend to
specialize in knowledge concerning industries concentrated in their
respective districts.￿3
If a central bank features regional representation, the composition of the
monetary policy committee of the central bank has to strike a balance between
political and economic considerations (Akhtar and Howe, 1991): on the one
hand, a purely political approach aims at mirroring society￿s composition of the
currency area, setting up a monetary policy committee proportional to popu-
lation weights, party preferences etc. On the other hand, membership in the
monetary policy committee, purely based on eﬃciency considerations, re￿ects
the idea that regional representation can improve the accuracy of information
about the state of the economy. In such a case representation of regions or
national member states is related to the information content provided by their
representatives. ￿Over-representation￿ of small countries or regions can be de-
sirable if their economic situation is relatively more uncertain than the rest.
We abstract from any political, regional or national considerations regarding
the voting behavior of the members of the MPC.4 Instead, we take a purely eco-
nomic perspective and investigate the consequences for the optimal composition
of the monetary policy committee if the uncertainties regarding the state of the
respective economies within the currency area are unequally distributed.
3 The model
3.1 Informational uncertainty and regional representation
Aggregate statistics (e.g. provided by a central statistical oﬃce) aim at depicting
the economic situation. However, data is often only available with a certain
lag (GDP data, for instance, exist only on quarterly basis), whereas monetary
policy decisions require up-to-date information. By the time decisions have to
be taken, other sources of information are needed to decrease the uncertainty.5
Uncertainty about the state of the economy essentially results from not
knowing the personal situation of every inhabitant. Perfect information is iden-
3Goodfriend (1999), p. 4. ￿ Other arguments to motivate regional representation are
that federalism might help to overcome political business cycles (Lohmann, 1998) and that
regional central banks communicate monetary policy to the public (e.g. Wellink et al., 2002).
The latter argument is strong in a currency area covering several language barriers, but not
necessarily so in countries such as the US.
4It has been stressed that ￿...the Governing Council of the ECB is a collegiate body where
decisions are taken from a euro area-wide perspective￿ (Duisenberg, 1999).
5See also Bottazzi and Manasse (2002) and Felligi (1989). Greenspan (2000) notes that
the regional FED Presidents ￿know what is happening in the various regions of the country
well before the hard data are collected by national statistical agencies￿.
3tical to knowing each inhabitant￿s economic situation. However, usually the
number of inhabitants is so large that collecting such perfect information would
be very costly. To overcome this uncertainty, ways have to be found to aggre-
gate individual information. A natural starting point is the city level.6 Suppose
each city nominates one representative, who knows all inhabitants of his city
personally. He collects all individual information and is thus able to provide an
accurate description of the state of the economy in his city. The more local rep-
resentatives share information in the monetary committee, the more accurate
the description of the state of the national economy that can be derived and the
likelihood of making a judgement error decreases.
For the purpose of this paper we assume that that the state of the economy
is fully characterised by its in￿ation rate, πest.7 The statistical oﬃce of the
currency area supplies an estimate of the state of the economy, but by the time
this information becomes public, the economic situation of each individual might
have changed, so that πest can deviate from the true state of the economy, πtrue.
In other words, πest may contain an observation error, ε, which by de￿nition
is identical to the sum of the individual observations errors (i.e. individual
deviations from πest):8
ε = πest − πtrue
= e11 + ... + e1v1 + e21 + ... + e2v2 + ... + en1 + ... + envn (1)
where vi is the number of inhabitants in city i and n is the number of cities.9 We
assume that all individual observation errors eij have zero mean and are uncor-
related.10 In a ￿rst-best world the monetary policy committee would invite all
citizens, thereby removing all informational uncertainty. However, as we show
below it might be eﬃcient not to exceed a certain number of representatives,
so the information needs to be aggregated. If the number of cities is large, a
selection of representatives must even be made between the diﬀerent cities.
We assume that each city-representative possesses more up-to-date local in-
formation than the national statistical oﬃce. After bundling all individual in-
formation he knows the true state of ￿his￿ regional economy (i.e. he knows
6Alternatively, the country could be divided into ￿regions￿, ￿counties￿, ￿districts￿ etc.
7Clearly, the central bank could also care about other variables. In that sense, in￿ation
should be regarded as a container variable, e.g. comprising other indicators or representing a
certain relationship between growth and in￿ation.
8To keep the model simple the uncertainty of every individual enters with the same weight.
Implicitly, this assumes that wealth is equally distributed, otherwise wealthier people should
be given a larger weight (due to their larger economic weight they exhibit stronger in￿uence on
aggregate in￿ation). An alternative approach would be to base uncertainty on GDP weights.
Qualitatively, both approaches lead to similar results.
9In all equations time indices are skipped for the sake of clarity.
10Later we assume that within a currency union national observations errors can be corre-
l a t e d( s e es e c t i o n3 . 4 )
4ei1 +...+ eivi = ei). If all local representatives were present in the MPC meet-
ing, the observation error made by the statistical oﬃce could be estimated as
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where n is the number of cities and ei the observation error at the city level.
T h em o r er e p r e s e n t a t i v e sa r ep r e s e n t ,t h el o w e rt h ev a r i a n c eo ft h ee r r o rε
(i.e. Va r (ε) declines in the number of regional representatives). Intuitively, this
occurs because by providing certainty about the state of the economy in his city,
the regional representative reduces a part of the potential error with respect to
t h eo v e r a l ls t a t eo ft h ee c o n o m y .
Regarding the value of getting more information by inviting one additional
representative (i.e. the ￿returns to extra information￿) we have to make an
assumption about the variance of the error terms, Va r(ei).S t a r t i n gf r o mt h e
idea that the economic situation of each individual is equally uncertain, two
cases can be distinguished.
￿ I ft h ec o u n t r yi sd i v i d e di ns u c haw a yt h a te a c hc i t yc o n s i s t so ft h e
same number of inhabitants, inviting an additional delegate reduces the
uncertainty by a ￿xed amount: Each representative provides information
about the same number of inhabitants, the returns to having one extra
person in the monetary policy committee is constant. Such a situation is
depicted by the straight line in ￿gure 1.
Conceptually, very strict assumptions are needed to justify why the returns to
information should continue constantly (e.g. same number of inhabitants per
city, same degree of uncertainty at the individual level etc.). Therefore, this
case will not further be analysed. Instead, a situation where not all cities are of
equal size seems more realistic.
￿ If the numbers of inhabitants diﬀer across cities, the reduction in uncer-
tainty from having a person from a large city exceeds the reduction in
information from having a representative from a small city: in the former
case the economic situation of a large group of people becomes known,
whereas in the latter case the representative only provides information
about a few individuals.11 Formally, this implies that the observation
11One could additionally assume that the informational uncertainty regarding some cities is
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Figure 1: Constant and decreasing returns to information
errors have diﬀerent variances.
If the error terms have diﬀerent variances the return to inviting one extra repre-
sentative is, ap r i o r i , unclear. But by ordering all cities according to the variance
of the error term, the returns to information are decreasing: the city with the
highest uncertainty sends the ￿rst representative, then ￿ proceeding along this
ordering ￿ each consecutive representative removes a smaller share of uncer-
tainty than his (her) predecessor. Thus, the returns to inviting more people are
decreasing in the number of representatives already present. Analytically:
Va r(ε)=f(r), such that f0(r) < 0 and f00(r) > 0,
where r is the number of representatives. This case is depicted in the concave
curve in ￿gure 1. We call this case ￿decreasing returns to information￿. To solve
the model algebraically, a functional form for the decreasing returns is needed.
Several functional forms ful￿l these criteria, we have decided to use the following
exponential speci￿cation:
Va r(ε)=σ2e−λr. (4)
The shape of the graph depends on the intrinsic uncertainty, σ2,w h i c h
determines the intersection of the graph with the y-axis, and how fast an addi-
tional represenative can reduce the uncertainty, λ. The latter parameter can be
regarded as a proxy for the degree of agglomeration (or eﬃciency for representa-
tives gathering information): if country 1 has more inhabitants than country 2,
but both are divided into the same number of cities, the uncertainty decreases
faster for country 1 (i.e. λ1 > λ2).
higher than for others, e.g. because they are more prone to external shocks or because of their
geographical location etc. For clarity we have refrained from introducing economic weights at
t h ec i t yl e v e l ,a sq u a l i t a t i v e l yt h i si d e ai sc a p t u r e db yd i ﬀerences in variances, σ2
i.
6Having established a negative relationship between regional representation
and uncertainty about the state of the economy, we proceed by showing that
eﬃcient local representation typically not implies full representation of all in-
habitants. Then, we examine the optimal composition of the monetary policy
committee, by looking ￿rst at optimal regional representation at the national
level then we analyse the case of two countries forming a monetary union.
3.2 Why full representation is not optimal
In our model, the bene￿ts from local representation are given by the reduction
in economic uncertainty: depending on the number of local MPC members, un-
certainty decreases. This comes, however, at a cost: The more local represen-
tatives are invited, the more diﬃcult it will become to process the information,
the more lengthy the discussions and costs for travels of the delegates etc. in-
crease. Although the exact relationship of these costs are unknown, it seems
safe to assume (i) that increasing the number of representatives yields costs and
(ii) that these costs rise exponentially.12 In other words, a function relating
the number of delegates (r) to costs of local representation should ful￿ll the
following criteria:
Costs(r)=f(r), such that f0(r) > 0 and f00(r) > 0.
In ￿gure 2 we plot two functions for costs and bene￿ts of regional repre-
sentation. The function form we have chosen here is somewhat arbitrary, but
message of the graph is clear: more local representation is bene￿cial, but only
up to a certain point. For r>m the costs of involving more regional represen-
tatives exceed the bene￿ts, which is why full representation ￿ i.e. inviting every
citizen ￿ is typically not bene￿cial.
In reality, determination of the maximum number of representatives in the
monetary policy committee, m, is a political decision. It might coincide with
the m of ￿gure 2, but it need not. For the rest of our paper, we therefore simply
assume that the number of committee members has been set exogenously to m.
3.3 Regional representation in its simplest form
We assume the monetary authority has a single objective, i.e. to minimise the
deviations of the true in￿ation rate πtrue from a given target in￿ation rate π∗.
12I.e. it seems realistic that a committee￿s ￿capacity for eﬃcient and timely decision-making￿
(ECB, 2002) suﬀers more from an increase in number of committee members from 100 to 1000
than if they rise from 5 to 10.
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Figure 2: Costs and bene￿ts of regional representation
We assume it can control in￿ation directly.13 The loss function is given by:








Optimal instrument setting Informational uncertainty (6)
As we can see from equation (5) the loss function of the monetary policy com-
mittee is the sum of two parts: the ￿r s tp a r tr e f e r st ot h eo p t i m a lr u l ef o r
monetary policy decision-making, the second to in￿ational uncertainty.
Proposition 1 The optimal rule for monetary policy (i.e. the ￿r s tp a r ti ne q .
5) is invariant to the composition of the MPC.
Proof. Ex ante, E(ei)=0for all ei.O fc o u r s e ,E(ei) 6=0ex post, i.e. after
all representatives have revealed their local information, but the composition of
the MPC is invariant to that.
This implies that to minise equation (5) we can concentrate on selecting
regional representation in such a way that the likelihood of making an error in
the assessment of the current state of the economy is minimized. This reduces
the loss function to:
e L = Va r(πtrue)=Va r(πest − ε)=Va r(ε) (7)
Minimising this loss function yields a straightforward solution, as all local rep-
resentatives are all ordered according to their uncertainty: the best strategy is
to pick the ￿rst representative from the city with highest uncertainty (i.e. with
13This assumption is frequently found in the literature, see e.g. Rogoﬀ (1985).
8the highest number of inhabitants), and to proceed down the list to cities with
lower probability of making a judgement error.
3.4 Optimal regional representation in the monetary pol-
icy committee of a currency union of two countries
3.4.1 A central bank￿s loss function in a currency union
Next, we investigate the optimal solution if two countries14 decide to form a
currency area. We retain the idea that aggregate statistics of both countries
can be subject to the information uncertainties sketched above.
In the previous section we have assumed that deviations from the aggregate
forecast are uncorrelated.15 Between countries, making such an assumption is
less realistic: as we cannot exclude the possibility that e.g. due to international
trade links the economic situation between countries might be correlated, we
allow for the possibility that observation errors between countries are correlated.
In that case the regional representatives may not be aware of the fact that the
local information they provide actually not only contains news about the state of
the economy in their own country, but is also aﬀected by the economic situation
in the other country.
In other words, the regional representative continues to provide regional
information. However, the nature of the information they provide changes:
the observation errors are actually in￿uenced by what is happening in both
countries. To introduce correlation between ε1 and ε2 we assume that they are
linear combinations of two underlying (unobservable and uncorrelated) country-
speci￿c disturbances, η1 and η2.16 Analytically,
ε1 = αη1 +( 1− α)η2 (8)
ε2 =( 1 − β)η1 + βη2. (9)
We say a country￿s observation error is correlated with the rest of the currency
area if know this country￿s state of the economy can provide information use-
ful to judge other country￿s economic situation. Note that e.g. a decrease in
α implies that the country-speci￿c disturbance of country 2 has become more
important in the observation error of country 1 but not vice versa, or simply
14In what follows we use the terms ￿currency union￿ for the currency area and ￿countries￿
for regions, districts etc. Of course all results apply equally to supra-national and federal
institutions.
15A possible explanation why this assumption seems realistic is that if any pattern would
exists between cities within a country, the national statistical oﬃce would take this pattern
into account and correct its estimation accordingly.
16This way of introducing correlation does not imply model inconsistency in the forecasts
supplied by the statistical oﬃce. Instead, it simply re￿ects that fact that economic spillovers
between countries need not, but might occur.
9speaking: the in￿uence of country 2 on the observation error of country 1 in-
creases, e.g. because country 2 is a large country and country 1 is a small one.
Note ￿nally that for α = β =1the observation errors of both countries are
uncorrelated.17
We assign economic weights to the countries participating in the currency
union, a1 and a2,r e ￿ecting diﬀerences in size. The union-wide true and esti-
mated in￿ation rates, πtrue
CU and πest
CU, respectively, become the weighted averages



















As before the MPC aims at minimizing deviations of the true union-wide in￿a-
tion rate from its target level π∗. Its loss function now becomes:
L = E(πtrue
CU − π∗)2 (11)
In analogy to equation (5) the loss function of the supra-national monetary
policy committee, given by eq. (11), can be split into a component referring to
the information uncertainty and a component referring to the optimal rule for
monetary policy decision-making. Again we can reduce the information problem
to minimizing the informational uncertainty:
e L = Va r(πtrue
CU )=Va r(a1ε1 + a2ε2) (12)
The question who should be represented in the monetary policy comittee can
be answered in two steps: ￿rst, a choice has to be made regarding the country
of origin, second within each country representatives have to be chosen. The
solution to the second question has been outlined in the previous section, in
what follows we explore the division of committee members with regard to their
country of origin. In other words, we are interested in an optimal solution for
r1, the number of committee members from country 1, on the basis of which
the share from country 2 can be calculated as (m − r1) representatives.
3.4.2 The optimal monetary policy committee
Using equation (4) the variance of the judgement errors in the two countries can





17We make the simplifying assumption that α and β take values between 0.5 and 1.
10F r o me q u a t i o n( 8 )a n d( 9 )i tf o l l o w st h a t 18
e L = Va r(a1 (αη1 +( 1− α)η2)+a2 ((1 − β)η1 + βη2))
=( a1α + a2 (1 − β))
2 Va r(η1)+( a1 (α − 1) − a2β)


















α2β2−(1−α)2(1−β)2 (1 − α)
2 . (19)
Equation (17) basically states that loss is given by the weighted, scaled uncer-











In the optimum the marginal reduction in uncertainty in both countries (￿MRUi￿)
must be equal. The optimal solution for the shares of both countries in the mon-




























= m − r1. (22)
In the simplest case both countries are fully symmetric regarding the (weighted)
economic uncertainty and the returns to information (a1σ1 = a2σ2 and λ1 =
λ2). In that case the optimal representation is r1 = r2 = 1
2m. If the informa-
tional uncertainties between the countries are not correlated (α = β =1 )from
equation (21) and (22) we can derive the following propositions for a given m:
Proposition 2 A higher degree of agglomeration leads to an increase in repre-
sentation in the monetary policy committee.
18Note that the variances of the country-speci￿cd i s t u r b a n c e sc a nb ee x p r e s s e di nt e r m so f
the (known) variances of observation errors, ε1 and ε2:
Va r (η1)=
β2
D1 Va r(ε1) −
(1−α)2
D1 Va r (ε2) (15)
Va r (η2)= α2
D1 Va r(ε2) −
(1−β)2
D1 Va r (ε1) (16)
whereby D1 = α2β2 − (1 − α)2(1 − β)2.
11Proof. Assume ￿without loss of generality￿ that the reduction in uncer-
tainty in country 2 is faster than in country 1, i.e. λ2 = λ + θ,w h e r eλ = λ1,














Simply speaking, a higher degree of agglomeration correponds to dividing
the same number of inhabitants in a country over less, but larger cities. Then,
as the city size increases, the information provided by each city representative
becomes more important. In the optimum MRU1 should be equal to MRU2,
therefore relatively more representatives from country 1 are needed.
Proposition 3 A higher (weighted) degree of informational uncertainty leads
to an increase in representation in the monetary policy committee.
Proof. Formally, assuming λ1 = λ2 = λ, we allow for diﬀerent degrees of



















Note that diﬀerences in weighted uncertainty can result from (i) diﬀerent
economic weights or (ii) because the assessment of a country￿s economic situa-
tion is relatively more diﬃcult. Lastly, we investigate how these results change
if we allow for nonzero correlation between the two countries.
Proposition 4 A country￿s representation in the monetary policy committee
is increasing if the information its representative provide help to judge the eco-
nomic situation in other countries.
Proof. The ￿rst derivative of r1 is decreasing in β,t h e￿rst derivative of r2







Intuitively, if β decreases the informational uncertainty in country 2 becomes
more dependent on the state of country 1￿s country-speci￿cd i s t u r b a n c eη1.The
information provided by representatives of country 1 becomes more valuable,
as it also allows judging the state of country 2￿s economy. More delegates from
country 1 are needed and the share of country 2 in the MPC decreases. If α
increases, country 1 becomes more ￿independent￿. The information its delegates
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Figure 3: Sub-optimal regional representation
provide become less valuable, since they are only relevant to judge country 1.
Consequently, country 1￿s share in the MPC declines.
3.4.3 Graphical analysis of the two-country case
Graphical analysis of the results yields some additional insights. For our exam-
ple we assume two equally uncertain countries (σ2
1 = σ2
2 =1 )of diﬀerent size.
We start by assuming both countries are uncorrelated (α = β =1 ) and to keep
the graphs simple, we chose the parameters for the ai￿s and λi￿s such that the
￿rst derivative of the variance of the error term has the value of 1 at point 0.
This is consistent with country 2 being smaller than country 1, but uncertainty
declining faster in country 2, or put diﬀerently: country 1 is not only smaller,
it is also divided into more cities than country 2.19
In ￿gure 3 we plot the marginal reduction in uncertainty (MRUi) provided
by each representative for the two countries as a function of ri, i.e. the ￿rst
derivative of Va r(εi)=aie−λiri.20 Suppose that the total number of committee
members has been set at 20 and following a political decision both countries send
exactly 10 representatives. Is country 1 overrepresented, as in terms of size it is
smaller than country 2?
Figure 3 shows that the marginal reduction in uncertainty for both countries
is not equal if an equal number of representatives comes from both countries.
As the reduction in uncertainty by the last representative of country 2 is smaller
than by the respective colleague from country 1, the aggregated uncertainty in
the currency union could easily be further reduced if the 10th representative
19The selection of the parameters does not critically in￿uence our results.
20Note that on the vertical axis we plot −MRUi, i.e. the negative values of Va r (εi),a st h e
￿rst derivative is, of course, negative. This change was purely made for expositional clarity
and does not furter aﬀect our results.
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F i g u r e4 :O p t i m a lr e g i o n a lr e p r e s e n t a t i o n
from country 2 would be replaced by an 11th delegate of country 1. Finally,
note that the total reduction in uncertainty about country 1 is given by the
surface ABCD1, whereas the total reduction in uncertainty about country 2
equals ABCD2.
The optimal solution is characterised by equal marginal reduction of uncer-
tainty in both countries, as eq. (20) shows. To ￿nd this solution graphically, we
aggregate the marginal reduction in uncertainty horizontally.21 The left part of
￿gure 4 displays the marginal reduction in uncertainty provided by each repre-
sentative, the right part ￿ obtained by horizontal aggregation of two curves in
t h el e f tp a r to ft h e￿gure ￿ shows the marginal reduction of uncertainty for the
entire currency union, depending on the size of the committee m (m = r1+r2).
For any committee size, a horizontal line between the two graphs shows the
optimal representation shares for the two countries. In that case we see that
the optimal representation entails that the smaller country 1 sends 12 represen-
tatives and the larger country 2 sends 8.
We can also evaluate the impact of non-zero correlation graphically. Assume
for instance that country 1 in￿uences country 2, but not vice versa. In terms
of eq. (8) and (9) this implies α =1and 0.5 < β < 1. The graphs change as
follows (the derivations are given in appendix A.1):
1.
∂(−MRU1)
∂β < 0: the decline in β shifts the MRU1 to the right.
2.
∂(−MRU2)
∂β < 0,t h eMRU2 also shifts to the right. Note, however, that ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ
∂(−MRU1)
∂β





Figure 5 shows the eﬀect of a decrease in β. We see that for both countries the
MRU-graphs shift to the right, but the shift of the MRU1 graph is larger. In
21Horizontal aggregation of marginal reduction in uncertainty can be compared to aggre-
gating demand curves in standard microeconomic theory. Analytically, horizontal aggregation
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Figure 5: Positive correlation (a decrease in β) in the two-country case
the right part MRU1 and MRU2 are again horizontally aggregated to obtain
the graph MRUCU.R e p e a t i n gt h es a m ee x e r c i s ea sb e f o r ew en o ws e et h a ta sa
result of this shift the share of country 1 increases, whereas the share of country 2
decreases. Intuitively, if country 1 also in￿uences the informational uncertainty
for country 2, country 1 representatives become relatively more important. By
similar analysis it is possible to analyse the eﬀects of an decrease in the scaled
uncertainty, i.e. variation of ai or σ2
i.
3.5 The monetary policy committee in larger currency
unions
Our ￿ndings for the two-country case can be extended to larger currency areas
in a straightforward way. Assume a currency union of three countries. All
countries can in￿uence each other, i.e.
ε1 = α1η1 + α2η2 +( 1− α1 − α2)η3 (23)
ε2 = β1η1 + β2η2 +( 1− β1 − β2)η3 (24)
ε3 = γ1η1 + γ2η2 +( 1− γ1 − γ2)η3, (25)
whereby the αi, βi and γi￿s are all between 0 and 1. Proceeding along the same
lines as in the previous section, we can express the loss function as follows:





where the formulas for the weights w1, w2, w3 are given in appendix A.2. Min-
imizing the above loss function with respect to r1 and r2 yields the optimal
15representation of the three countries:
r1 = C
￿








































where C = 1
λ3λ2+λ3λ1+λ2λ1. As before in the simplest case all three countries
are uncorrelated and fully symmetrical and as a result, all countries should be
equally represented in the monetary policy committee (i.e. r1 = r2 = r3 = 1
3m).
Variation of the parameters of the model con￿rm the previous results of the two-
country model.
1. A higher degree of agglomeration leads to an increase in repre-
s e n t a t i o ni nt h em o n e t a r yp o l i c yc o m m i t t e e : This can e.g. be seen by
assuming that the coeﬃcient for the reduction in uncertainty in countries 1 and
2i se q u a la n ds m a l l e rt h a ni nc o u n t r y3( w es e tλ1 = λ2 = λ and λ3 = λ + θ,
λ > 0 and θ > 0). Then,
















provided that m is suﬃciently large.22
2. A higher (weighted) degree of informational uncertainty leads
to an increase in representation in the monetary policy committee:





2 = a and a2
3σ2
3 = a + φ, φ > 0. Then,
















The intuition behind this result is as follows: Country 1 and country 2 are
identical and can be regarded as one big country. This reduces the problem of
￿nding the optimal representation share for all three countries to a two-country
problem, i.e. ￿nding the optimal representation for country 1+2 and country
3. Proposition 3 continues to hold; note also that since country 1 and 2 are
identical the optimal shares of country 1 and country 2 are equal.
Lastly, we can re￿ne proposition 4:






16Proposition 4a A country￿s representation in the monetary policy committee
is increasing if the information its representative provide help to judge the eco-
nomic situation in other countries. An increase in correlation between certain
countries leads to an decrease in representation of countries not correlated with
this group, a decrease in correlation leads to an increase in representation of the
rest of the currency area.
Proof. As an example, we investigate a case where the observation errors
between country 1 and 2 are correlated, but independent of the observation error
of country 3 (analytically, the parameters in equations (23)-(25) are subject to
the following restrictions: α1 + α2 = β1 + β2 =1and γ1 = γ2 =0 ). The



















provided that λ3 is large enough relative to λ1 and λ2.23
The intuition is as follows:
Increasing correlation (β1 increases) implies that the country-speci￿ce r -
ror of country 1 becomes more important for country 2. The share of
country 1 representatives increases and the share of country 2 in the MPC
decreases. The combined share of country 1+2 increases, as ￿ due to the
increase in the correlation of the observation errors between those two
countries ￿ the ￿value￿ of their representatives increases. Consequently,
the share of country 3 in the MPC declines.
Decreasing correlation (α1 increases) implies that the informational un-
certainty in country 1 depends more heavily on the country-speci￿cd i s -
turbance η1 and the representatives from country 2 can provide less in-
formation about country 1. The share of country 2 decreases, the share
of country 1 increases slightly, but not suﬃciently to oﬀset the decrease








ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ). The overall eﬀect of the representation of
country 1+2 is negative, as country 3 gains additional representational
23More speci￿cally, the following conditions must hold:
￿
∂r1
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Figure 6: Nonzero correlation (increase in β1) in the three-country case
weight. Simply speaking, as the relationship between country 1 and 2
becomes less narrow, the value of the information provided by their rep-
resentatives declines, which is why relatively more representatives from
country 3 should be invited.
3.5.1 Graphical analysis of the eﬀect of nonzero correlation in the
three-country case
We can also analyse the case of nonzero correlation between two or more coun-
tries graphically. As an example ￿gure 6 shows the eﬀect of an increase in
correlation between country 1 and 2 on the representation of country 3 (i.e. β1
increases): The left graph displays the aggregated MRU of the countries 1 and
2, the middle graph shows MRU3 and the right graph the MRU in the entire
currency union. Country 1 and 2 can be treated as one big country: the share
of representatives from the ￿rst two countries is given by r1+2, whereas country
3 sends r3 representatives to ￿ll the MPC of m members.
Now assume that β1 increases, i.e. the observation error of country 2 can




∂β1 > 0 and
∂(−MRU2)





The aggregated MRUCU of the currency union will also shift to the right,
re￿ecting the shift in the ￿big￿ country 1+2. Keeping the number of representa-









ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ, consequently the share of country 2 represen-
tatives declines (recall in ￿gure 5).
181+2 increases to r1+2 due to the nonzero correlation, whereas country 3 will
lose representatives (from r3 to r3). This occurs because the marginal gain
from inviting an additional representative from the ￿rst two countries exceeds
the gains an increase in r3.
4 Regional representation at the European Cen-
tral Bank and the US Federal Reserve
A central implication of our model is that if within a currency area the state
of the economy of certain regions is relatively more diﬃcult to assess than for
other regions, then these ￿uncertain￿ regions should be overrepresented in the
federal committee. In what follows we show that this model is compatible with
the ￿disproportionate￿ (i.e. not related to economic size) weighting of regions in
the ECB Governing Council and the US FOMC.25
The ECB Governing Council consists of ECB Executive Board Members
and all 12 national central bank (NCB) Governors. According to the recently
adopted ￿rotation scheme￿, the number of NCB Governors will be limited and
they will exercise their voting rights with diﬀerent frequencies, depending on
(a) the member country￿s size and (b) the size of its ￿nancial sector. When all
current and future EU members will have joined EMU, the ￿rst group votesat
80% of all ECB Governing Council meetings. Economically, this group repre-
sents 76% of the euro area. The second group, which will vote in 57% of all
meetings represents economically 23% of the euro area, whereas the third group
￿ in 38% of all meetings ￿ economically represents 1%.26 Judged against their
economic weight small countries seem largely overrepresented.27
Our model oﬀers an explanation. Using each country￿s weight and the vot-
ing frequency of the ECB￿s rotation scheme, we calculate the ￿information un-
certainty￿ for each of the three groups, as implied by our model. Parameters
like the speed of the reduction in informational uncertainty are obviously dif-
￿cult to measure, therefore we have simply made the following assumptions:
we assume that all three groups of countries are uncorrelated and we set λ1 =
λ2 = λ3 =0 .5. Table 1 shows the results for the euro area, setting the implied
25Obviously, in practice any voting scheme is a political decisions and may therefore not
fully re￿ect economic considerations.
26The exact voting frequency also depends on the total number of countries joining the euro
area (European Central Bank, 2002).
27In the discussion about the rotation scheme overrepresentation has been feared on the
basis that coalitions of small countries might ￿dominate￿ the ECB Governing Council (see
e.g. Baldwin et al., 2001, Berger, 2002, and Berger and de Haan, 2002): if ￿small￿ countries
(small in terms of GDP weight, such as the EU acceding countries) are largely overrepresented
in the ECB Governing Council, a situation might occur where a coalition of small countries
(representing, say, 35% of euro area GDP) sets monetary policy for the entire union ￿ or
worse, according to their own needs, rather than the economic requirements of the entire euro
area (the so-called ￿regional voting bias￿, see Meade and Sheets (1999, 2002).
19ECB GDP Uncertainty FED GDP Uncertainty
Group 1 76% σ2 Group 1a 73% σ2
Group 2 23% 12.8σ2 Group 2b 24% 8.1σ2
Group 3 1% 7133.1σ2 Group 3c 2% 612.3σ2
aSan Francisco, New York, Chicago, Atlanta, Richmond, Dallas,
bCleveland, Boston, Kansas City, Philadelphia, St. Louis, c Minneapolis
Table 1: Regional representation at the ECB and the US FED
uncertainty for the largest group at 1.0: as it turns out, under these (somewhat
arbitrary) assumptions the informational uncertainties in the third groups need
to be considerably higher than in the other two groups to be compatible with
our model. Looking at an enlarged EMU, this seems reasonable: The assess-
ment of the economic situation of the acceding countries (all in part of group 3)
is likely to be considerably more diﬃcult than that of the current EMU mem-
bers, e.g. because their economic structure undergo severe changes, because few
historical data is available and because the time series that exist are are likely
to exhibit structural breaks. Then, increase the share of small countries beyond
their economic weight might be bene￿cial.
In the FOMC of the US Federal Reserve, 11 regional FED Presidents share 5
votes. They are divided as follows: New York has 1 vote, Chicago and Cleveland
have 0.5 vote whereas all other presidents have 0.33 vote each (Meade and
Sheets, 2002). Grouping the diﬀerent FED branches in three groups of (roughly)
s i m i l a re c o n o m i cs i z ea sd o n ef o rt h eE C B ,w es e et h a tt h ei m p l i e du n c e r t a i n t y
across the smaller FED districts is somewhat smaller than in the enlarged euro
area. However, also in the US small FED districts are overrepresented.
5 Conclusions
Our model was based on the idea that although local considerations should not
in￿uence monetary policy decision in a monetary union, local information might
improve the accuracy of the judgement of the current economic situation. This
is a main motivation for including regional FEDs or NCBs in the formulation of
US and European monetary policy. We have investigated the implications of this
argument under fairly general conditions, in fact the only relevant assumption
we make is that the levels of uncertainty surrounding the current economic
conditions in the countries forming monetary union are (potentially) diﬀerent.
Based on a simple framework we show that if the accuracy of the judge-
ment of the local economy improves with the number of representatives from
that region in the monetary policy committee, it may make sense to increase
the representation of regions where the economic situation is relatively more
uncertain, beyond their economic weight. The ￿ipside of this argument is that
20a large economic weight of a certain country alone is not suﬃcient to justify a
large representation in the monetary policy committee. This holds in particular
if representatives from other countries can provide similar information.
We can summarise the implications as follows: the optimal representation
of a region in the common monetary policy committee is increasing (i) in the
uncertainty regarding the state of its economy, (ii) its economic weight (i.e. the
number of inhabitants), (iii) the lower the ￿returns to information￿, and (iv) its
correlation with the rest of the currency area.
The main conclusions of the paper extend beyond the optimal composition
of a monetary policy committee. In a federal nation state, committees at the
national level typically also include regional representation. Their added-value
in a committee is that they represent local interests, which ￿ conceptually ￿
are not diﬀerent from the uncertainties about the economic state of the region
used in the model. Proceeding along this reasoning, the optimal composition
of any national committee of a federal nation state is not diﬀerent than the
composition of a monetary policy committee and should therefore follow along
the lines of our model.
A Appendix: Additional derivations
A.1 Graphical analysis: The two-country case





The signs of the derivatives with respect to β are determined by the sign of
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α(2α − 1)(α − 1)
(1 − α − β +2 αβ)
2 ≤ 0






≤ 0; but note that
ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ
∂ (−MRU1)
∂β
ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ≥
ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ
∂ (−MRU2)
∂β
ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ.
21A.2 The country weights in the three-country case










































DET =( α1β2 (1 − γ1 − γ2))
2 +( β1γ2 (1 − α1 − α2))
2 +( γ1α2 (1 − β1 − β2))
2
−(α1γ2 (1 − β1 − β2))
2 − (β1α2 (1 − γ1 − γ2))
2 − (γ1β2 (1 − α1 − α2))
2 .
In the case of nonzero correlation (as investigated in the text) the weights
are reduced to
w1 =
β1 (1 − α1)+2( 1− β1)β1 + α1 (1 − β1)
β1 (1 − α1)+α1 (1 − β1)
,
w2 =
2(1− α1)α1 + β1 (1 − α1)+α1 (1 − β1)
β1 (1 − α1)+α1 (1 − β1)
,
w3 =1 .
A.3 Graphical analysis: The three-country case
In the text we examine the following structure of the errors: e1 = α1n1 +
(1 − α1)n2; e2 = β1n1 +( 1− β1)n2;e3 = n3,w h e r e b yα1 ≥ 0.5,β1 ≤ 0.5. On
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2α1β1 − β1 − α1
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α1 (2α1 − 1)(α1 − 1)
(2α1β1 − β1 − α1)
2 ≥ 0, but
ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ
∂w1
∂β1
ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ >
ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ
∂w2
∂β1
ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ
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